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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that exploitation is a form of domination, domination for
self-enrichment. In a slogan, exploitation is a dividend of servitude—a benefit
the powerful extract by converting the vulnerable into their servants. The
paper argues that what makes exploitation wrong is that it constitutes dom-
ination-induced unilateral service to others; that this form of servitude is
necessarily cashed out in terms of labour time or effort; that competing
accounts of exploitation fail to do justice to the servitude dimension; and
that what distinguishes capitalism historically is the way it reproduces a struc-
tural dilemma between dominated work and no work.
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This article argues that exploitation is a form of domination, domination for
self-enrichment. In a slogan, exploitation is a dividend of servitude—a
benefit the powerful extract by converting the vulnerable into their serv-
ants. The article elaborates on this idea, defends it against criticism, and
argues that it is superior to competing contemporary accounts of exploit-
ation. More specifically, theorists of exploitation face three urgent ques-
tions. First, what is the metric of exploitation complaints, the yardstick for
their individuation and measurement? Second, what are their wrongmaking
features? Third, what is the modality of these features under capitalism, that
is, what gives exploitation under capitalism its historical specificity? Liberal
political philosophy couches its answer to the metric question in terms of
(access to) welfare, goods, capabilities, or a combination thereof; to the
wrongmaker question in terms of coercion, rights or fairness; and to the
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modality question by appeal to the mutually consensual nature of transac-
tions by reciprocally situated commodity owners. This article offers better
answers to these questions, inspired by the Marxist tradition. I argue that
what makes exploitation wrong is that it constitutes domination-induced
unilateral service to others; that this form of servitude is necessarily cashed
out in terms of labour time or effort; that competing accounts of exploit-
ation fail to do justice to the servitude dimension; and that what distin-
guishes capitalism historically is the way it reproduces a structural dilemma
between dominated work and no work.
The article has six sections. Section 1 discusses the metric, or currency, of
exploitation complaints, focussing on seminal work by John Roemer.
Section 2 studies wrongmakers; it argues that exploitation is domination-
induced unequal exchange. Section 3 discusses structure; it argues that
what makes capitalist exploitation historically specific is its mode of repro-
duction of dominated labour. Section 4 situates exploitation complaints
squarely within a domination account and discusses its implications.
Section 5 and 6 show that the domination account is superior to two com-
peting contemporary liberal accounts, one based on vulnerability (due to
Allen Wood) and one based on fairness (due to Richard Arneson).
1. Metrics
Exploitation theory is largely concerned with the control and distribution of
the surplus from positive-sum transactions. What makes such transactions
particularly interesting is that they are typically mutually consensual and
beneficial. Contrast theft: both exploitation and theft are forms of wrongful
taking, but theft is necessarily involuntary and typically zero-sum.
Exploitation, by contrast, need not be involuntary1 and is often positive-sum.
Indeed, mutually beneficial and consensual transactions are the normative
standard to which defenders of capitalism usually appeal. If anti-capitalist cri-
tique is to have any bite, it must be able to explain why such transactions
are, mutual benefit notwithstanding, objectionable.
This section studies how exploitation gets cashed out in mutually
beneficial transactions between consenting adults. Consider:
Pit - A, B and C are alone in the desert. A and C find B lying at the bottom
of a pit. A proposes to extract B, on condition that B works for A for a wage
of $2/day for the rest of B’s life. C also proposes to extract B, on condition
that B works for C for $1/day for the rest of B’s life. B accepts A’s offer.
The Pit case involves a proto-labour–market relation. Complying with C’s offer
of $1 or with A’s offer of $2/day is a significant improvement over B’s pre-
1‘Need not’: slavery is exploitative, but involuntary.
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proposal situation of, say, $0/day. In addition, each of A and C have the assurance
that, were B to reject one offer, she could still get out by accepting the other.
Pit involves exploitation; the question is why. The answer I offer is that it mat-
ters, from the point of view of freedom, who serves whom and why. I begin by
showing that, for all the criticisms levelled against the idea of unequal exchange
of labour, it remains conceptually indispensable to understanding why A exploits
B in the context of economic relationships.
1.1. Unequal exchange of labour
One of Marxism’s enduring legacies to exploitation theory is a set of
definitions based on the unequal exchange of labour (UE). UE offers a specif-
ically labour-based interpretation of what it means to take advantage of
another.2 On this definition, A exploits B only if B unilaterally serves A, or,
equivalently, A extracts unreciprocated labour flow from B, where A and B
may be individuals, groups, or classes.3 Let LGi stand for the amount of
labour time agent i expends, or gives, in production, and let LRi stand for
the amount of labour i receives through her consumption bundle. Then UE
between A and B obtains if and only if:
UEð ÞLRA>LGA and LRB<LGB
The UE definition has some compelling features. Suppose A owns two
slaves, B and C. B is very productive: she produces a surplus S over and
above what is necessary for her subsistence. A appropriates S. C, on the
other hand, is not very productive: she produces just enough to keep
herself alive. A does not appropriate any surplus from C, and hence does
not benefit at C’s expense. It is plausible that A exploits B, but not C. The
UE definition resonates with this intuition.4 The UE definition also allows
that the labour contribution variable, LGi ; is defined as a proportion of total
labour expended. The upshot is that one can use it to construct a general
2 People can be exploited without extraction of labour. Selling your kidneys, or your blood, can be
exploitative. Although these transactions would fall under the generic definition of exploitation
offered in this paper—domination for self-enrichment—they would not involve labour extraction.
The more limited purpose of this paper is to explain how the generic definition applies to social
reproduction, that is, to the reproduction of social structures through the objectification of human
mind and muscle. On this, more limited, ambition, blood and kidneys do constitute objects of social
reproduction.
3Unreciprocated labour flow is therefore a generalization of the Marxian idea of the extraction of
surplus labour. The locus classicus here is Roemer (1982). Roemer showed that, under certain
assumptions about original endowments and preferences, total labour time in the economy will
decompose into a group of agents who optimize by consuming more labour than they produce
(presumptive exploiters) and a group of agents who optimize by consuming less labour than they
produce (presumptive exploitees).
4In this case, LRA>L
G
A ¼ 0 and LRB<LGB ; while LRC ¼ LGC : Note that UE is uncontaminated by
assumptions about the determination of the value or price of individual commodities: it neither
entails nor presupposes such a theory. It is therefore orthogonal to the Ricardian labour theory of
value (see Roemer 1982 and Cohen 1988 for discussion).
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equilibrium theory of exploitation, that is, a structural account of the
distribution of labour flow and its forms of reproduction.5
A further advantage of UE is that it can be straightforwardly related to
the notion of effort. Instead of representing actual or counterfactual labour
time,6 the designated labour contribution variable LGi might represent
the amount of effort i expends, or the amount of effort discounted by
the amount i can expend. Call the discounted form of effort relative effort.
Absolute and relative effort are measures of how intensely i endeavours to
serve herself and others, that is, provide effort for them.
By way of illustration, suppose that C is less productive than B, such that
LGB>L
G
C ; where this inequality is exclusively due to B’s superior talents. Then
it is possible to define eGi as a relative effort variable, such that e
G
i expresses,
say, the quantile within the effort distribution of i’s talent type.7 This
removes the influence of talent heterogeneity, thereby equalising C’s
contribution with that of any other (more or less talented) agent in
the same quantile. In the case where the inequality in labour given is exclu-
sively due to talent inequality, we get: eGB ¼ eGC : More generally, unequal
exchange of effort between A and B obtains if and only if:
UE’ð ÞeRA>eGA and eRB<eGB
These are different ways of thinking about unequal exchange, that is, what
it means for B to serve A without A serving B. This failure of reciprocity seems
to provide a necessary condition for exploitation. It does not, however, pro-
vide a sufficient condition. For suppose that one social group freely optimises
by gifting whatever goods it creates, through its collective efforts and with its
own labour power, to another group. Then, intuitively, the resulting unequal
exchange is not exploitative. Unreciprocated or unilateral service, in and of
itself, does not constitute exploitation. On the domination view defended in
this article, UE constitutes exploitation if and only if it issues from domination:
it is A’s domination of B that converts B’s unilateral service to A into servitude.
So unequal exchange, on this view, is merely the currency of servitude.
Now, Roemer (1994, chapter 3) disputes this conclusion: he claims that
UE is neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitation. Since I agree with
Roemer about sufficiency, I only discuss his argument against necessity.
5If the product of labour, in the economy as a whole, has a monetary expression, as it does under
capitalism, and if capitalism presupposes a separation between propertied capitalists and
propertyless workers, then it can be shown that the UE definition satisfies certain attractive axioms,
such as the “new interpretation” of the labour theory of value. See Foley (1982) and Dumenil (1984)
for the new interpretation, and Veneziani and Yoshihara (2018) for the proofs.
6Actual labour time is the amount of time B spends producing. Counterfactual labour time is the
amount of time B would have worked, had she produced at the average rate of productivity. Marx’s
notion of socially necessary labour time is a counterfactual magnitude.
7On types, see Roemer (2000). On relative effort, see Roemer and Trannoy (2016).
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1.2. Roemer on unequal exchange
According to Roemer, UE is not necessary for exploitation because asset-rich
people—presumptive exploiters—may give more labour or effort to asset-poor
people—presumptive exploitees—than they receive from them. Consider:
Domestic Servant - A is rich and B is poor. A hires B as A’s domestic servant
for the rest of B’s life. A’s and B’s preferences over work and leisure jointly
imply that, in equilibrium, labour flows from A to B. That is, B will receive
more labour than she gives and A will receive less.
Suppose that, in the context of Domestic Servant, A dominates B. By the UE
definition, however, labour flows the wrong way, from A to B. So A does not
exploit B. On Roemer’s view, per contra, A does exploit B. Starting from this
intuition, Roemer infers that Marxists should not be interested in labour flow
and, by implication, in UE-type exploitation. Marxists should focus, instead, on
distribution and property relations. Roemer’s alternative, non-UE definition of
capitalist exploitation goes as follows. For any coalition of agents A and its
complement B, A exploits B if and only if:
(i) were B to withdraw from the society, endowed with its per capita
share of society’s alienable property (i.e., produced and nonproduced
goods), and with its own labour and skills, then B would be better off
(in terms of income and leisure) than it is at the present allocation;
(ii) were A to withdraw under the same conditions, then A would be
worse off (in terms of income and leisure) than it is at present;
(iii) were B to withdraw from society with its own endowments (not its
per capita share), then A would be worse off than at present.
(Roemer 1994, p. 40)
Roemer calls this the property relations definition. The definition entails
that labour flow is irrelevant to exploitation: whether labour flows from
A to B or vice versa, as long as (i)–(iii) are satisfied, it is A who exploits B.
Roemer’s argument for the definition, and hence for the irrelevance
of labour flow, is invalid. For it is precisely because of the nature of the flow
that we should be interested in the transactions Roemer censures as unjust.
That is, Roemer’s examples are insensitive to the kind of power A’s wealth
confers upon A, and the kind of vulnerability B’s wealthlessness confers
upon B. The rest of this section elaborates.
1.3. Why unequal exchange is indispensable
Consider the Pit case. Suppose there is an inegalitarian distribution of ropes,
such that A has a rope, which B lacks; the distribution of ropes confers
power on A over B. That power, in conjunction with A’s disposition to use
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it, ensures that B will find it costly to leave the pit, that is, do what she has
reason to do independently of A’s power. So when A’s offer gets accepted,
A’s rope-conferred power gets channelled into B’s conditions of action. It is,
I think, the nature of this power, not the background distribution which
confers it, that makes the relationship between A and B objectionable.
To focus intuitions further, consider an example due to Cohen (1995,
chapter 8). There is unequal gun ownership, such that the highwayman, A,
owns a gun, but the rambler, B, does not. Cohen writes: ‘Highway robbery
is unjust because it is a transfer of money for the wrong reason (to wit, in
this case, the victim’s fear that the highwayman will kill him)’ (Cohen 1995,
p. 206). But then the objectionable feature of robbery is, once again, the
nature of the normative landscape that gun inequality creates—including
the fact that A can now get B to act for gun-given reasons—not the fact of
unequal gun distribution.8 A hinders B’s acting for reasons independent of
the gun-given reasons, which is what makes A’s transaction with B unfree.
Of course, sometimes unequal gun ownership does not lead to robbery.
There is, as a consequence, no unequal exchange of labour. In these cases,
there is no exploitation. It does not follow, however, that the relationship
between A and B is unobjectionable. That is, if A uses his gun-conferred
power to get B to respond to the reasons that power grounds, then A domi-
nates B. So A can dominate B, even if B does not provide unreciprocated ser-
vice. Suppose that Cohen’s highwayman, A, changes his mind in the last
minute, removing the gun from B’s forehead. Given A’s gun-conferred power,
B remains unable to respond to reasons she has, independently of that power.
As I will explain in Section 3, this constitutes domination. If I am right, then
the conclusion carries over to cases like Domestic Servant. That is, although
there is no exploitation in these examples (because surplus labour flows in
the wrong direction), the wrongmaker—A’s domination of B—survives.
In response to this set of objections, Roemer (1994, chapter 5) softens
his opposition to UE. He considers the following example (which he attrib-
utes to Erik Wright):
Rich and Poor - Consider the case of two agents, Rich and Poor, who are
initially endowed with 3 and 1 units of capital, respectively. This distribution is
unfair: suppose that the fair distribution is egalitarian. Rich wants to consume
prodigiously, while Poor only wants to subsist and write poetry. Rich works up
all his capital stock, but wants to consume even more than what is thereby
produced, and so Poor hires Rich to work up Poor’s capital stock, paying Rich
a wage and keeping enough of the product to enable him to subsist… I
previously wrote that Rich did exploit Poor in this example, but I now do not
think so. Therefore I would substitute, for clause [(iii)], the following: [A] gains
by virtue of the labor of [B]. (Roemer 1994, p. 106, emphasis added)
8For discussion of Cohen’s own vacillations on the significance of labour flow for exploitation, see
Vrousalis (2015, chapter 4).
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Since Rich would be worse off if Poor withdrew with her actual share, and given
that Rich would be worse off if Poor withdrew with her per capita share,
Roemer’s property relations definition implies that Rich exploits Poor. But this is
counterintuitive, Roemer concedes: the counterfactuals in his definition do not
tell us enough about the nature of the relationship between Rich and Poor to
pick it out as exploitative.9 He emends the definition accordingly. But now the
question arises: why is it that, on Roemer’s emended definition, A must gain ‘by
virtue of B’s labour’? What is so special about gain from labour?10
The answer, I submit, must have something to do with relations of
dominion and servitude: who serves whom and why. By reintroducing labour
into his definition, Roemer smuggles something like a domination account
into his conception of exploitation. It is significant, in this connection, that
an early version of the property relations definition (Roemer 1982, p. 195)
replaces term (iii), the ‘withdrawal with one’s own share’ condition, with: ‘A
being in a relation of dominance to B’. If I am right, Roemer’s conception of
exploitation has come full circle; from ‘dominance’ (Roemer 1982) to maldis-
tribution (Roemer 1985) to domination (Roemer 1994).
There is, therefore, some justification for thinking about exploitation in
terms of unequal exchange, especially when it comes to economic relation-
ships. In what follows, I assume that exploitation complaints must be
cashed out in terms of labour time or effort. More precisely: A exploits B
only when A receives unilateral service from B, in accordance with some
variant of the UE definition. UE is a necessary, though not sufficient, condi-
tion for exploitation. I now show how domination completes the set of suf-
ficient conditions.
2. Wrongmakers
2.1. The general account
I begin by sketching an account of domination. Suppose A has power over
B and is disposed to use it. These are two power-facts. Power-facts are rea-
son-giving: a doctor has power over her patient, a teacher over the student,
a coach over an athlete, and so on. When things go well, the motivations of
the patient (in taking the medicine), of the student (in reading the book),
and of the athlete (in running the marathon), do not reflect the power-facts.
That is, their actions are performed for the sake of values independent of
the dispositions of doctors, teachers, and coaches, respectively. Contrast
the power of the slaveowner over the slave, of the highwayman over the
rambler, of the husband over the wife in the patriarchal family. Here things
9The case can be made that Poor exploits Rich. I discuss this possibility in the Appendix.
10In Section 2.3, I ask whether there is something special about labour tout court.
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are not going all that well. That is, all three cases seem to involve relations
of dominion and servitude, or a relation between an overdog and an under-
dog. What explains the difference between the two sets of cases?
The answer is that in the latter set of cases (slaves, ramblers, wives), B’s
normative reasons to do what the proposer proposes constitutively track
considerations that are dependent on the power-facts. That is, B has no rea-
son to do what slaveowners, highwaymen and husbands propose, independ-
ently of what they want B to do, are interested that B does, or are disposed
that B does. Moreover, all three proposers are, by existential necessity, out to
get B to take these power-facts as her reasons. Contrast doctors, teachers and
coaches: when things are going well, their relationship to patients, students,
athletes helps the latter track normative requirements independent of the
former. So, when things are going well, the proposer’s power merely facili-
tates action for the power-independent consideration; the proposer empow-
ers the proposee’s recognition of, and reaction to, that consideration.11 More
succinctly: the nondominator’s power is self-effacing in favour of power-inde-
pendent, objective values; the dominator’s is not.12
On this view, there exists a class of wrongs that consists in A getting B
to take her power over B as a reason for B to perform the power-directed
act. Exploitation is a subset of this set of wrongs; it obtains when the
power-directed act, performed for the power-given reason, is geared
towards A’s enrichment. Exploitation, by implication, is domination for self-
enrichment; the dividend A extracts from B’s servitude.13 The rest of this
section discusses exploitation’s connections with vulnerability, on the one
hand, and with domination, on the other. I then take up several important
conceptual implications of the domination view.
2.2. The place of vulnerability
Exploitation entails the instrumentalization of vulnerability, the using and
playing on another’s weakness. But what is vulnerability? Vulnerability is
sometimes conceived as a two-place relation between a person (including
the person’s well-being) and an object: for example, B is vulnerable when B
stands under a boulder, such that the boulder is likely to fall, harming B.
What one might call social vulnerability, on the other hand, is a three-place
relation. Social vulnerability involves at least two agents, A, B, and an
object. Here A has her finger on a button, which controls the boulder, or
11For the idea of acting for reasons, see Korsgaard (2008) and Julius (2013).
12I defend the idea of non-domination as self-effacing power in ’Domination as self-effacing power’,
which is available from me upon request. Some may demur that my argument depends on an
idiosyncratic or even implausible account of domination. In what follows, I urge them to plug in
their favoured theory of domination: liberal, republican or feminist.
13For a recent attempt to formalise some of these ideas in a systematic way, see Skillman (2018).
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the first aid kit; A therefore possesses the wherewithal to remove B from
harm’s way, or to ameliorate any harm that befalls B.
These relational properties—vulnerability-to, and dependence-on—are
irreducibly social forms of powerlessness: they imply that some agent has a
measure of control over the vulnerable party’s actions, abilities and well-
being. Any complete theory of exploitation must, in principle, be able to
construct a composite index incorporating these diverse dimensions of dis-
empowerment into a single metric of social vulnerability.
What is the relationship between social vulnerability and social power?
On my understanding of that relationship, they are extensionally equiva-
lent. Call this the equivalence claim.14 Equivalence explains the sense in
which B is vulnerable, and A powerful, in the Pit case. On this explanation,
vulnerability is to power what defeat is to victory. This analogy does not
preclude the kind of structural relationship between the powerful and the
vulnerable, where one group or individual dominates another. For example,
the victory of one army may be constituted by the defeat of many, just as
the defeat of one army may be constituted by the victory of many. By the
same token, the power of individual or group A may be constituted by the
vulnerability of many Bs, and the vulnerability of B may be constituted by
the power of many As. These conceptual configurations are all consistent
with what may be called structural domination, which I discuss in Section 3.
Now, the instrumentalization of vulnerability is necessary but not suffi-
cient for exploitation. What completes the set of sufficient conditions is a
specific kind of instrumentalization, that is, A getting B to take B’s vulner-
ability as her reason for action. If vulnerability and power are equivalent, as
I have argued, then B’s taking her vulnerability as a reason is tantamount to
B’s taking A’s power as her reason. This has important implications for the
putative logical and moral priority of domination, which I discuss presently.
2.3. The priority of domination
If to exploit is to benefit through the domination of others, then exploit-
ation is a form of domination. More precisely, the order of explanation goes
as follows:
a. A exploits B.
So
14The equivalence claim can be thought of as the non-normative parallel of the Hohfeldian relation
between liability and power. According to Hohfeld (1919), if A possesses a normative power, then A
can change B’s first-order Hohfeldian incidents (B’s claims, permissions, and so on). Conversely, if B
possesses a liability, then A can change B’s first-order incidents. Normative liabilities and normative
powers are logically equivalent.
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b. A benefits through A’s domination of B.
So
c. A dominates B.
What needs to be shown is that (b) is the best explanation for the
wrongness of (a). This section and the next make the positive case for this
inference. Sections 5 and 6 rebut two alternative popular explanations,
both of which contradict the inference.
Exploiters, I argued, must treat weakness as an opportunity for self-
advancement. In terms of the phenomenology of this treatment, A, the
exploiter, arrogates to herself a kind of superior status: whether by action or
omission, she treats her own needs as superior to B’s and steers B towards
treating her own needs as inferior. Consider the Pit case again. Here, A’s offer
seems to degrade B’s needs, ranking them as less urgent than A’s. At the
same time, B’s needs are taken as a feature of A’s situation to be played on,
indeed instrumentalized, to yield a benefit for A. B, on the other hand, can
only improve her own lot by accepting this ranking, indeed by seeing herself
as someone whose desires and needs lack priority. When B takes A’s Pit offer
as a reason to serve A, B responds to the power-facts, as such, which is what
A wants. And since, by assumption, this power-induced transaction involves
unequal exchange, it is an instance of exploitation.
There is another way to state this. In Pit, A’s proposal effectively says to
B: ‘You are weak, I am strong. Take my power (to press your labour-power
into my service) as your reason (to serve me)’. When the ploy succeeds—
that is, when the proposal has uptake—both A and B come to treat B as
smaller than she is, to wit, as someone who takes her mere features (in the
Pit case, her labour-power) as a reason to serve A. B is treated as smaller
than she is, in the sense that she cannot do what she has reason to do
(work, sleep, write poetry) by responding to these reasons as such—that is,
work, sleep and write in response to the justificatory content of these activ-
ities, independently of B’s power. Instead, B’s normative identity is reduced
to responding to A’s control over those mere features and abilities of B that
A finds useful. A knows this; indeed, she culpably uses her power to bring it
about. A’s disposition, in this sense, is the disposition of a master.
In response to this argument about the explanatory priority of domination, a
question immediately arises about the moral relevance of labour. There is an
ancient Marxist belief, dating back at least to Plato’s Republic, according to
which labour—the exertion of mind and muscle to affect worldly outcomes—is,
in some sense, special. This specialness inverts the order of explanation from (a)
to (b), such that the domination of person by person is derivative or metaphys-
ically subordinate to exploitation. On this view, to exploit someone’s whole per-
son is to treat that person as her mere features, that is, to treat her as less than
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she is. So, for example, to exploit a woman sexually is to treat her as if she were
her genitals; to exploit a manual worker is to treat her as if she were her body;
to exploit a mental worker is to treat her as if she were her brain, and so on. Call
this the exploitation-first view.
On the exploitation-first view, exploiters necessarily treat exploitees as
fragments, not of their own body, but of their own person.15 A person is
thereby reduced to the hands and legs and brain and genitals that serve
her master. Domination, on this view, is exploitation minus the domination-
induced benefit to the exploiter. There is no space to discuss this view
here; I merely flag it as a conceptual possibility cognate to the view I am
defending. And even if the exploitation-first view is sound, the currency
and modality questions remain.
I now discuss modality.
3. Structure
This section offers an answer to the modality question: what features make
capitalist exploitation historically specific? I argue that capitalism betokens
a specific form of structural domination; capitalist reproduction systematic-
ally confronts its purveyors, the working class, with a choice between no
labour and undominated labour. The principal locus of dominated labour is
the labour market. Wage-labour, the commodity bought and sold in that
market, is dominated labour.16
I begin by offering a definition of structural domination. After explaining
how the capitalist labour market satisfies that definition, I elaborate on the
role of agential dispositions in the reproduction of capitalism.
A social structure S, a reproducible set of power relations, betokens structural
domination just when S’s reproduction is explained, in part, by the systematic
removal of undominated options from the option sets of agents in S. Patriarchy,
for example, is a social structure whose reproduction depends on systematic
restriction of access to undominated options in women’s choice sets. By the
same token, capitalism confronts workers with a dilemma, structurally homolo-
gous to that faced by women in patriarchy: choose between dominated labour
and no labour. I explain how capitalism reproduces that dilemma presently.
3.1. Unfreedom in the market
Economists distinguish between two roles of markets: allocative and dis-
tributive. The allocative role consists in communicating relative scarcity to
15Contrast Marx’s famous discussion of Menenius Agrippa in Marx (1976, 481).
16This section rehearses some ideas defended extensively in "The Capitalist Cage: Structural
Exploitation and Collective Agency in the Market", which is available from me upon request.
REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY 11
appropriately situated agents. Leon Walras famously described markets as
spatiotemporally extended auctions, in which the auctioneer announces
the relative scarcity value of widgets, given total demand for all marketed
goods. In its allocative role, under Walrasian assumptions, the market seems
morally unobjectionable; it merely signals relative scarcities. It is different
with its distributive role. Consider the capitalist labour market. Its existence
presupposes the separation of workers from the means of production. The
question then becomes whether P, the owner of these means, helps Q, the
non-owning worker, act for reasons independent of P’s dispositions and
power. If P helps Q in this way, then her power is self-effacing and she does
not dominate Q. If not, then her power dominates Q.17 I now argue for the
latter conclusion.
Note, first, that the separation between capital and labour confers on
owners power over workers. To possess a power over someone is to be
able to get her to do things, by giving her incentives. Suppose Q, a proper-
tyless cook, is hungry. Cookshops are privately owned. Q must therefore
work for the cookshop-owner, P, or go hungry.18 Therefore P possesses an
ownership-conferred power over Q’s cooking ability. What must be shown
is that this power gets Q to respond to the power-facts (and not the
power-independent facts that justify the content of the activity, such as Q’s
nutrition, the quality of the food, etc.). Insofar as P’s role is distributive, that
is, consists in providing nonmoral incentives, it clearly does. For, in the capit-
alist labour market, P’s relation to Q is exclusively mediated by power,
through offers, threats and throffers.19
These uses of power are, moreover, deliberate—you don’t make a profit
by fluke. In fact, they are explicitly aimed at extracting a maximum surplus
from Q’s labour. So here is what it means to be a cook under capitalism:
that you must cook even when you are not hungry, and that you can’t
cook, even when you are. The capitalist cage, in other words, obstructs
both cooking (if you are unemployed) and cooking for the reasons that jus-
tify cooking (if you are employed). These two hindrances are, moreover,
existentially connected: by dint of her propertylessness, the employed cook
is subject to the threat of being unable do what she has reason to do,
namely cook, while the unemployed cook, by dint of her joblessness, is sub-
ject to the offer of cooking for the wrong, power-determined, reason
(assuming she is lucky enough to receive such an offer!). It is therefore built
17Republicans, such as Pettit (1997, 2012) would ask whether P’s power is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unchecked’.
The rest of this section can be read as an argument that capitalist power is always arbitrary, in the
relevant sense.
18I leave it open, for the moment, that P and Q are individuals rather than groups.
19Offer: ‘If you cook for me, I’ll raise your wages’. Threat: ‘If you don’t cook for me, I’ll fire you’.
Throffer: ‘If you cook for me, I’ll raise your wages. If you don’t, I’ll fire you’.
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into the structure of labour markets that P should ensure that the power-
facts have uptake.20 When they do, P dominates Q.
So capitalist reproduction systematically reproduces a situation in which
Q has to choose between no work and dominated work—being paid to
obey. Capitalism is, in this sense, structurally homologous to certain forms
of patriarchy, which restrict the options of women to dominated sex and
no sex.21 Structural domination systematically restricts and, in the limit,
eliminates the undominated option of free, mutually affirming activity.
There is, however, a way that markets can be made to serve freedom, as
opposed to domination. To illustrate this, I now register one way of draw-
ing the distinction between the allocative and the distributive function
of markets.
3.2. Freedom in the market
Joseph Carens (1981) defends a system of market-based, profit-maximising
firms, whose profits get redistributed after production, such that the post-
tax distribution is egalitarian, in the appropriate metric. Carensian socialism
enlists a set of moral incentives in production, which, in conjunction with
redistribution, engender equality. Unlike some of Carens’ defenders (e.g.,
Cohen 2009), I do not take this to be a representation of an idealised form
of socialism. Rather, Carens presents a stylised picture of how we might har-
ness the allocative function of markets without the distributive; that is,
have market structure without capitalism. In this picture, it is false that
powerful market actors have dominating power over others; they only act
as traffic regulators of sorts. Let me explain.
Contrast a boss under capitalism (P) with a boss under Carensian social-
ism (R). P and R issue instructions to Q, who does the cooking: ‘make the
omelette with mushrooms, not tomatoes’. This instruction gives Q reasons
to prefer mushrooms to tomatoes regardless of whether P or R utters it. But
P’s utterance has a different speaker meaning from R’s. When P utters the
instruction, Q understands that, if she uses mushrooms, she might get a
pay-rise; if she uses tomatoes she might get fired. Q proceeds to make the
omelette by responding to the power-facts, that is, by responding to P’s
power to raise wages or fire Q. When R utters the instruction, however, Q
20Some economists maintain that the existence of power relations in the market requires dropping
the assumption of perfect competition or market clearing (see, e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1992). This
move confuses economic with market power: perfectly competitive and clearing markets are
compatible with inequalities of wealth. Such inequalities, in turn, help constitute commodity-based
wealth as an alien power over and above the direct producer. See Roemer (1982, chapters 1–3) for
a seminal argument to that effect.
21See Frye (1983) and MacKinnon (1989) for discussion of the ‘double bind’ of patriarchal relations.
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understands that, if she uses mushrooms, she is saving social resources; if
she uses tomatoes, she is wasting them.
Under Carensian socialism, prices and wages possess a signalling func-
tion only: all they do is communicate relative scarcities.22 It is as if the
Walrasian auctioneer jumped out of the eggs, yolks running down his fore-
head, shouting: ‘Make it with mushrooms!’. Under capitalism, by contrast,
markets assume the form of an alien power, standing over and in oppos-
ition to the direct producer; the worker and the means of production are
not immediately reconcilable through the familiar Walrasian mechanism—
assuming we live in a Walrasian universe. So when R utters the instruction,
R merely helps Q act for reasons independent of R’s power and dispositions.
When P utters it, P gets Q to take these dispositions as reasons to perform
the power-directed act. This is why P’s power, unlike R’s, dominates Q.
3.3. Structural vs. interpersonal domination
On the account defended in this paper, domination is existentially dependent
on P’s dispositions, namely her disposition not to efface the power-facts from
Q’s conditions of action. This is what it means to treat another as a servant.
But if capitalist economic structure excludes agential dispositions—in the
sense that it only refers to the optimising behaviours of propertyless workers
and propertied capitalists—then capitalist behaviour need not constitute
domination. That is, domination generically requires agential dispositions of a
certain kind, and since these dispositions are not necessarily part of capitalist
structure, capitalist structure does not necessarily involve domination.
This objection rides roughshod of the distinction between two kinds of
agential dispositions: interpersonal and structural. Interpersonal agential dis-
positions are dispositions of agents that are interpersonally grounded; they
pertain to contingent relations between agents and groups thereof.
Structural agential dispositions, on the other hand, are dispositions of
agents whose conferral is connected to structure by way of reproductive
necessity. More precisely, structural domination differs from interpersonal
domination in that only the former contributes to, and is necessary for, its
own reproduction. By the definition of structural domination, the power-
disposition bundle necessary and sufficient for domination must contribute
to the reproduction of that very domination. No such contribution is neces-
sary for interpersonal domination.
Consider two examples. Take, first, prison structure: its reproduction
requires certain dispositions on the part of the prison guards—that they
enforce discipline, that they keep inmates in line, that they discourage
22On the communicative value of market offers, see Harrison Frye (2017).
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them from organising, and so on. Insofar as these dispositions are necessary
for prison reproduction, in the sense that they figure ineliminably in the
explanation of that reproduction, they are instances of structural domin-
ation. The excessively violent prison guard—‘excessively’ in the sense that
her violence is unnecessary to prison reproduction—dominates the inmate,
but only interpersonally.23
Now take patriarchy: suppose its reproduction requires a minimum
amount of misogyny and a minimum amount of sexism, distributed across
a population of sexist and misogynistic agents that includes women.24
Suppose also that misogyny and sexism are measurable on a cardinal scale.
It is then possible to define the ‘average misogynist’ and the ‘average sexist’
as any agent whose disposition, shared equally across the existing popula-
tion of sexists and misogynists, would suffice to reproduce the existing
patriarchy. The set of acts and dispositions that fall under that description
would count as structural domination. The complement of that set, those
acts of misogyny or sexism that exceed the reproductively necessary aver-
age, would then count as interpersonal domination.
I now apply these ideas to capitalist economic structure. Capitalists dom-
inate workers by using their power over workers to extract maximum surplus
labour—that is, maximum unilateral service—from them. Insofar as this
power-disposition bundle is reproductively necessary for capitalism, it beto-
kens structural domination. Insofar as it is reproductively unnecessary, it
betokens interpersonal domination. As a reproducible structure of domin-
ation, capitalism requires certain agential dispositions on the part of both
capitalists and workers.25
I now offer refinements to the domination view, by considering import-
ant implications and objections.
4. Implications
4.1. Master and servant
Wood (1995) argues that instances of pilfering, looting and small-scale
manipulative extraction show that servants can exploit masters.26 But
23The idea of structural domination, thus defined, implies a notion of ‘surplus repression’, that is, the
possibility of domination surplus to what is necessary for social reproduction. See Cohen (1978,
chapter XI), Geuss (1981, pp. 17–18) and Roemer (1982, chapter 9) for different accounts of
surplus repression.
24Manne (2017) discusses how these two variables might interact.
25The intentions of capitalists are irrelevant here. The kindly capitalist, who gives away all her profits
to charity, is still disposed, on pain of competitive disadvantage, to extract as much labour as she
can from her workers at the point of production. In her structurally-conferred disposition, she is no
different from Henry F. Potter.
26See his subtle discussion of Doyle Lonnegan, the main gangster antagonist in the movie The Sting.
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servants do not, by definition, dominate masters. Therefore exploitation
does not entail domination. It follows that the domination account is false.
More precisely:
(a) If A exploits B, then A dominates B.
(b) Servants sometimes exploit their masters, despite the fact that masters
dominate servants.
(c) A dominates B, then it cannot be the case that B dominates A.
Claim (a) is the domination account; claim (b) is Wood. Claims (a)–(c) are
not jointly assertable. Crucially, if one affirms (b) and (c), then it follows that
(a) is false; the domination account fails. In defence of (a), I will argue that
(c) is false. I note, in passing, that (b) can be challenged. That is, pace Wood,
it is possible to construe pilfering, looting, and manipulative extraction by
servants merely as forms of resistance. This is one conceptual strand in
James Scott’s (1987) magisterial account of peasant resistance in Weapons
of the Weak. Scott’s account seems to imply that servants cannot exploit
their masters. Rather, pilfering and looting merely attenuate the exploit-
ation of servants by masters, giving the former a modicum of control over
their own lives. This line of argument is promising, but I will not pursue it
further. Instead, I will show that (c) should be rejected.
In general, the ascription of a power relationship is time- and
context-sensitive, where context includes information about the resource
distribution and background structure. Suppose Goliath possesses power
over David across times t1 and t3 in contexts C1 and C2, whereas David only
possesses power over Goliath during time t2 in context C3. What enables
David to destroy Goliath, if he does so, is not his powerlessness, but his
(temporally and contextually circumscribed) power over Goliath.
If this description of the Goliath–David relationship is sound, then
Goliath’s power over David is compatible with David’s power over Goliath.
And since such power might well involve domination, (c) is false. In other
words, it is conceptually possible that B possesses local mastery over A, such
that A is B’s local servant. A possesses global mastery over B if A possesses a
sufficient amount of local mastery, that is, possesses dominating power over
B in a sufficiently large set of (temporally and contextually indexed) contexts.
‘Reciprocal servitude’ is therefore not an oxymoron. This revision gives the
lie to (c) and renders (a) and (b) compossible: master-exploiting servants pos-
sess local mastery over their globally servant-dominating masters.
4.2. Exploiting billionaires
The Pit case, and examples like it, encourages the belief that exploitation is
possible only if the exploitee is in dire need, lacks reasonable or acceptable
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alternatives, or is in circumstances of deprivation or duress.27 That belief is
false. Consider:
Lawn mower - Zuckerberg knows a secret of Gates’s that Gates does not
want known. Zuckerberg has no moral obligation not to reveal it, despite
the harm it will inflict on Gates, and no moral obligation to reveal it.
Zuckerberg asks Gates to mow his lawn for the year, in return for
nonrevelation of the secret. Gates grudgingly agrees.
In Lawn mower, Zuckerberg does not threaten Gates with something
independently impermissible—he is permitted to reveal the harmful infor-
mation. But he does do something impermissible, namely exploit Gates.
This judgement goes through independently of Gates’s basic needs or func-
tionings. That is, whatever the threshold for basic-needs satisfaction and
reasonable alternatives, Gates meets it, even by his own reckoning, both
before and after the sensitive information is revealed. So, if Zuckerberg
exploits Gates, then complaints of exploitation go through independently
of claims about basic needs. It suffices that Zuckerberg has power over
Gates—power enough to get Gates to perform some drudgery, such as
mowing Zuckerberg’s massive lawn for a year—and that Zuckerberg’s
power does not help Gates act for reasons independent of Zuckerberg’s
lawn-related dispositions. Gates performs domination-induced unilateral
service for Zuckerberg; he is exploited.
Of course, needs matter. But that mattering is the mattering of moral
weight, not the mattering of moral ground. That is, Zuckerberg’s exploit-
ation of Gates is much less morally urgent than Foxconn’s exploitation of
Shenzhen workers: there are very weighty reasons to try to attenuate the
latter but not the former. This does not, however, affect the ground of the
complaint, which is, in both cases, the conversion of Gates and the
Shenzhen workers into someone’s servant.
4.3. Lucrative offers
Now consider:
Lecherous Offer - A is a lecherous billionaire; B earns the median wage. A
says to B: ‘If you sleep with me, I’ll give you $1,000,000.’ B accepts the offer.
Suppose that Lecherous Offer is an instance of domination. Does A
exploit B? On the definition of exploitation offered in this article, the answer
is: ‘it depends’. There is a good theoretical reason for this ambivalence.
Normally, the labour content of $1,000,000 is higher than the labour content
of sexual intercourse. This means that, in Lecherous Offer, labour time may
27Variants on this idea have been defended by Sample (2003) and Snyder (2008), among
many others.
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be flowing the wrong way—from A to B, rather than vice versa. The rest of
this section elaborates.
Suppose that the domination account is true, such that exploitation is
domination-induced unequal exchange. Suppose, further, that Lecherous
Offer involves domination, in the sense I have already mentioned. If A is to
exploit B, then the amount of total labour given by B must be greater than
the total labour given by A. Suppose the labour content of sexual inter-
course is 8 hours. In the contemporary United States, the labour content of
$1,000,000 in 2018 prices is about 14,000 hours.28 In other words, if the
$1,000,000 represents A’s labour, and if A’s labour is average labour, then
Lecherous Offer involves A giving 14,000 hours and getting 8. Labour flows
the wrong way, from rich to poor, in which case A seems not to be exploit-
ing B.
Three remarks are relevant here. First, Lecherous Offer is an extreme case
of a very widely observed phenomenon that generally does involve exploit-
ation, namely sex work. Sex workers provide sex in return for a market-
determined price. In general, these prices will be lower than $1,000,000—
otherwise demand would be negligible—and tend to reflect a labour con-
tent lower than the median or average wage. This implies that sexual
labour will, in general, tend to flow from poor to rich—sex worker to client.
The domination account does dub these cases as exploitative. Second, in
the case of Lecherous Offer, it matters whether these 14,000 hours—and the
$1,000,000, which is its monetary expression—were accumulated by
A through his own labour, or through the labour of others. The intuition
that A exploits B may ride on the idea that these 14,000 hours are not his
to give. If, for example, these hours are the fruit of prior exploitation, then
A may yet be exploiting B. Third, whatever the source of these hours,
A dominates B, even if he does not exploit her.
Now, these individualistic quibbles may be socially irrelevant to
judgments of exploitation, because they ignore structure. That is, in order
to ascertain whether A is an exploiter and B an exploitee, we need to know
how much labour each contributes and receives as a proportion of total
social labour, what property relation explains their share, and how that rela-
tion is reproduced. So, although it is conceivable that A does not exploit B
in Lecherous Offer, there is no conceivable capitalist society in which that
eventuality is realised. For, as a matter of structural necessity, capitalism
confronts workers with a dilemma: choose between dominated work—such
28The monetary expression of a unit of average labour is given by the ratio between net national
product and total hours worked to produce it. My assumption in making the labour-content
calculation is that the monetary expression of labour in the contemporary USA stands at about $70/
hour. On the very idea of the monetary expression of labour, see Foley (1982) and Dumenil (1984).
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as wage-labour—and no work. Sex workers, like all workers, grasp the first
horn of this dilemma.29
This concludes my exposition on the domination account. I now offer
further refinements, by contrasting it with, and defending it against,
competing theories of exploitation.
5. Against the vulnerability view
One account of the wrongmaking features of Pit is the vulnerability view.30
On this view, A exploits B if and only if A treats B’s vulnerabilities as
opportunities to advance her own interests (Wood 1995, p. 136). A’s Pit
offer qualifies as treating B’s vulnerabilities as opportunities to advance her
own interests. Therefore A wrongfully exploits B. Richard Arneson maintains
that the vulnerability view expresses sentiments that are ‘too high-minded’
(Arneson 2016a, p. 10). He asks us to imagine:
Cancer treatment - I live in an isolated rural region, in a region in which
health care insurance is unavailable. There is only one qualified surgeon in
the territory. After a routine check-up she informs me that I have a cancer
that will swiftly kill me unless surgery is done. Only she can do the surgery.
I’d be willing to give everything I own in exchange for the needed surgery,
but the actual price she charges is modest, better than fair. This is business
as usual for the surgeon. She makes her living by striking bargains like this
with people in conditions like mine. She makes a good living. (Arneson
2016a, p. 10)
Arneson maintains that there is nothing exploitative about the surgeon’s
behaviour in this example. Yet she does take advantage of the patient’s
vulnerability, or treats it as an opportunity to advance her own interests.
The vulnerability view thus generates false positives.
Richard Miller has recently argued, along similar lines:
Allen Wood… has claimed that capitalist exploitation is, prima facie, wrong
because it derives from workers’ weakness or vulnerability and all benefits
derived from another’s weakness or vulnerability are, prima facie, wrong. But
the latter description of the tainting feature leads to the absurd conclusion
that oncologists and personal trainers are engaged, prima facie, in a morally
shady enterprise. (Miller 2017, p. 23)
I now argue that the domination view does not take the surgeon or
the personal trainer to be exploiting, for it is not a variant of the
vulnerability view.
29See Section 3 above. I discuss this account of capitalist reproduction in "The Capitalist Cage:
Structural Exploitation and Collective Agency in the Market". Wollner (2018) offers a cogent defence
of structural exploitation and its modal implications.
30This section borrows extensively from Vrousalis (2016).
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The first thing to note is that the original Pit case and the Cancer
treatment case are importantly distinct, as the latter involves stipulation
of a ‘modest, better than fair price’ (Arneson 2016a, p. 10).31 How is this fair
price determined? On Arneson’s view, exploitation necessarily violates
a fairness baseline, the distributive outcome that maximises some responsi-
bility-constrained prioritarian value function. Call this the fairness view—I
will discuss its plausibility later. For the moment, it suffices that the
domination view, much like the fairness view, can discriminate between
Cancer treatment and Pit. For Cancer treatment does not imply that A,
the surgeon, dominates B, the patient. Let me explain.
In Section 2, I argued that a necessary condition for domination is that A
subordinates B, or treats B as a servant. These notions are vague, but are
suggestive of how the domination view and the vulnerability view part
ways. Suppose that A dominates B just when A gets B to perform the
power-directed act for the power-given reason. This condition is not clearly
satisfied in Arneson’s and Miller’s examples. In order to ascertain whether
domination supervenes, we need more information about background
structure and about the concomitant dispositions it confers on A and B. So
the domination view does not generate the kinds of false positives that
Arneson attributes to the vulnerability view. By implication, the former is
generically more discriminating than the latter.
Arneson charges the domination view with overgenerating exploitation
complaints in another class of cases. Consider:
Comeupance – For a time my wife is unemployed, and her bargaining
position when it comes to family interactions is weak. I successfully demand
that we watch a steady diet of horror movies and grade B action films. The
tables are suddenly turned. She now has a good job and I have no steady
income. She now drives a hard bargain when the question arises, what
movies to see. We end up watching a stream of romantic comedies, which
she likes far more than I do. (Arneson 2016a, p. 11)
In this connection, Arneson claims that ‘the transaction as described
contributes toward an overall just outcome (more just than would occur if
the transaction did not occur) and does so in a way that is not procedurally
unfair or wrongful’ (Arneson 2016a, p. 15). It therefore does not involve
exploitation. Now, two of these three judgments—namely, that
Comeupance is procedurally innocuous and that it is not exploitative—are
questionable. Suppose that A prefers horror and B prefers comedy. They
arrive at the following arrangement: B will be A’s slave on Mondays and
A will be B’s slave on Tuesdays. Monday slavery implies that both watch
31I note, in passing, that ‘modest’ entails nonzero price, a position that is not argued for
by Arneson.
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horror—satisfying A’s preference—and Tuesday slavery implies that both
watch comedy—satisfying B’s preference.
This trading-place-slavery is surely objectionable, procedurally and other-
wise. It is also exploitative. So Comeupance and trading-place-slavery seem
to share a wrongmaking feature, namely mutually beneficial reciprocal
domination.32 I argued in favour of the conceptual coherence of reciprocal
domination, in Section 4.1, above. On the domination view, therefore, both
cases involve exploitation.
Arneson offers a ‘reciprocity’ version of the same example, in which A
and B take turns, alternating between horror and comedy. He maintains
that B’s power over A ‘ensures this fair result occurs’. When this happens,
‘[s]he brings about a just outcome by a not unfair means’. (Arneson 2016a,
p. 19) Thus, although B possesses power over A, and B benefits from that
power, B does not exploit A.
Arneson’s amendment is too underdetermined to yield his conclusion.
For surely it matters whether B gets A to watch comedy through credible
threats of enslavement, beating, or death, even if A can credibly threaten
similar sanctions should B not watch horror. In other words, when the rota-
tion occurs in such a way that A and B dominate each other, the out-
come—whether fair or unfair—is tainted. That outcome is more like
trading-place-slavery and less like a kingdom of ends: it is a reciprocity of
servitude, not of freedom. On the domination view, to exploit is to benefit
by constituting such servitude. Arneson’s examples, as presented, seem
compatible with exploitation, in that sense.
6. Against the fairness view
I now turn the tables against Arneson, Cohen and Roemer.33 I do this by
vindicating the domination view against the fairness view. On the fairness
view, A exploits B if and only if A takes unfair advantage of B, where the
unfairness baseline is decided by background distribution. I will adhere to
one influential formulation of this view, due to Arneson, and raise two
objections: one from lenience and one from trivialisation. According to the
lenience objection, the fairness view is too lenient on predatory, but pru-
dent, proposers. According to the trivialisation objection, the fairness view
trivialises the concept of exploitation, making it a mere upshot of distribu-
tive injustice.
32One important difference between the two examples is that Comeupance originally involves
patriarchy—the structural domination of women. This feature could be assumed away if both
agents in Arneson’s example were male.
33This section develops a line of argument from Vrousalis (2013).
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6.1. The lenience objection
Arneson subscribes to a luck egalitarian definition of the fairness baseline,
according to which we ‘maximize a function of human well-being that gives
priority to improving the well-being of those who are badly off and of
those who, if badly off, are not substantially responsible for their condition
in virtue of their prior conduct’ (Arneson 2000, p. 340). Equality in the rele-
vant metric is desirable if and only if it is responsibility-constrained.
Now consider:
Ant and Grasshopper – Ant works hard all summer and has ample provisions
for the winter. Grasshopper lazes about and in January has an empty
cupboard. Without interaction, Grasshopper will end up with welfare level
two, which amounts to dire misery, and Ant with three, bare sufficiency, and
in this scenario Ant is comparatively more deserving; the gap between the
welfare level Ant has and what he deserves is far greater for him than is the
comparable gap for Grasshopper. Ant proposes to sell some provisions to
Grasshopper at a very high price. Grasshopper accepts the deal, though he
would prefer to pay less and get more. With this deal in place, Grasshopper
ends up with welfare level three and Ant with twelve. Even after this
transaction, Ant’s welfare level is less than he deserves, by comparison with
the situation of Grasshopper. (Arneson 2016a, p. 11)
Arneson claims that ‘there is nothing prima facie wrongful’ in what the Ant
does when she charges for (costless) provisions at a very high price. He
thinks this conclusion follows from the unfairness view. This valid argument
shows why the fairness view is false. More precisely, if the Pit case involves
exploitation, then so does Ant and Grasshopper. Suppose, for example, that
by failing to accumulate provisions, Grasshopper finds herself incapable of
fighting soil erosion. This lands her at the bottom of a pit. Ant walks up to
her to offer work for $1/day for the rest of Grasshoppers life, when she
could have offered costless shelter. The possibilities, in the relevant met-
ric, are:
(Ant, Grasshopper)
(i): Do nothing: (10, 0)
(ii): Sweatshop: (11, 1)
(iii): Shelter: (10, 2)
Now, it is plausible to think that Ant has an obligation to help
Grasshopper. But one need not have a view on that to believe that (ii) is
morally worse than (iii). That is, if Ant decides to help (decides to do some-
thing other than (i)) then she must not opt for (ii), in part because doing so
constitutes exploitation. I take the widely shared intuition expressed in this
consequent as evidence that the domination account is plausible. But now
note that, if (ii) involves exploitation, then distributive injustice furnishes no
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necessary condition for it. For, according to Arneson, all of (i), (ii), (iii) are
equally acceptable at the bar of distributive justice.34
Arneson—and, indeed, Roemer—has nothing to oppose to such a
cleanly generated capitalism on exploitation grounds, and this is an embar-
rassment to his claims to offering an egalitarian theory of exploitation.35
The result generalises, I believe, to any theory of exploitation that posits
some defensible account of distributive injustice as a necessary condition
for exploitation. According to the domination view, Ant’s behaviour in Ant
and Grasshopper is no different from A’s Pit behaviour: both prey on the
weak for self-enrichment, when both have the (costless) option of helping
without so preying.36 Both thereby muster the power-facts to convert
others into their servants and, in so doing, exploit them.
Arneson rejects this conclusion. He believes that the fairness view will
not always take ‘excessive’ offers to be exploitative, independently of
the historical sequence of events that led to them. Luck egalitarianism is,
after all, a historical entitlement theory of justice (see Cohen 2011, chap.
6). But then his view lets some forms of predatory behaviour, such as
Ant’s, completely off the hook. This is the obverse of Anderson’s (1999)
famous complaint that luck egalitarianism is too harsh on weak, but
imprudent, proposal-recipients. That is, whether or not Anderson is right,
luck egalitarianism is too lenient on predatory, but prudent, proposers. In
treating such proposers too leniently, the fairness view generates false
negatives.37
34(ii) is, after all, an upshot of Grasshopper’s own choices or faults. One can construct examples
where the demands of distributive justice are not only unnecessary for, but also contradict (what
are, intuitively) claims of exploitation.
35Arneson, Cohen and Roemer can respond that a cleanly generated capitalism faces exploitation-
independent objections. But this is beside the point: what makes cleanly generated capitalism
interesting is precisely the pit-like nature it shares with its dirty cousins.
36Take another prominent example: leximin. Leximin does indeed dub (iii) as the most just
distribution of widgets, and therefore seems to give the intuitive answer. But the result is
misleading. Suppose the shelter outcome turns out to provide no substantial improvement in
Grasshopper’s condition, as follows:
(Ant, Grasshopper)
(i): Do nothing: (10, 0)
(ii): Sweatshop: (11, 1)
(iii): Shelter: (10, 1)
In this case, leximin dubs (ii) as the most just distribution, and therefore produces the same
counterintuitive result (and so does maximin, which recommends choosing between (ii) and (iii’) on
a coin toss). Exploitation and distributive injustice again part ways.
37Arneson’s attempt to soften the harshness of luck egalitarianism by appeal to a desert-based, as
opposed to a choice-based, specification of luck egalitarianism, or by acceding to a pluralist
understanding of its well-being requirements (p. 11), is moot in cases like Ant and Grasshopper. For
Grasshopper is not merely imprudent; she is completely undeserving (absolutely or comparatively,
pluralistically or monistically). And yet exploiting her still seems wrongful.
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6.2. The trivialisation objection
There is another, more general, problem with the unfairness view, namely
that it trivialises the concept of exploitation. Consider:
Free riders – Farmers take turns standing sentry at night, or are asked to pay
a fair share of the costs of maintaining the sentry scheme, which provides
safety for all neighborhood residents as a kind of public good. For residents
of the neighborhood, if anyone gains sentry scheme safety, all residents
must gain some of this good… Some residents decline to pay their fair
share of the costs of maintaining the scheme. They do this in order to free
ride; they understand that others will continue to supply the good even if
they decline to contribute. This is unfair taking of advantage, I would say,
and exploitive. But the free riders are not plausibly viewed as possessing
social power over the other cooperators. (Arneson 2016b, p. 6)
In this example, the non-cooperators exploit, but do not possess power over
the cooperators. The former a fortiori do not dominate the latter. Therefore,
Arneson maintains, exploitation does not presuppose domination.
Now consider a variant of Free riders: the cooperators are those, and only
those, who live on the periphery of the village. When bandits attack, they
will mainly harm those on the periphery. Cooperators therefore have more
to lose than non-cooperators. Indeed, this is why they cooperate. On the
fairness view, both the original and the amended Free riders cases involve
exploitation. On the domination view, however, only the amended case
involves exploitation. For only in the amended example do the non-cooper-
ators possess a power over the cooperators; it is, after all, their noncoopera-
tion that affects the interests of the latter so adversely. If that power
dominates, and if the non-cooperators benefit through that power, non-
cooperators exploit cooperators.
Of course, the domination view is consistent with thinking that the non-
cooperators treat the cooperators unfairly in the amended variant of Free
riders. But nothing is gained, and something is lost, if the wrongmaking fea-
tures of the latter case are assimilated into the former. For the amended
Free riders case does not involve mere unfair advantage-taking: there is a
wrongmaker surplus to that feature. The surplus consists in the possession,
by noncooperators, of dominating power over cooperators, which the for-
mer use to extract unreciprocated service—in the form of security—from
the latter. The power of noncooperators allows them to treat cooperators
as their servants. Put differently, exploitation is the dividend that noncoop-
erators earn from the servitude of cooperators.
The moral of this story, I think, is that not all unfair free riding counts as
exploitative. To make this clearer, consider another example. Suppose B is
fleeing persecution. She enters A’s boat and hides under the sails. B free
rides on A’s rowing effort, which moves the boat from one side of the river
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to the other. It is plausible that B takes advantage—perhaps unfair advan-
tage—of A. On the domination view, however, she does not exploit. Only
power-grounded advantage-taking constitutes exploitation, on that view.
On the fairness view, by contrast, ‘unfair treatment’ and ‘exploitation’ are
used interchangeably. What is the extra purchase of saying that A exploits
B, on this view? Arneson’s answer is ‘not much’. Indeed, he uses ‘unfair
treatment’ and ‘exploitation’ as synonymous. His recent essay on the topic
concludes as follows: ‘I come empty pockets when asked, what moral prin-
ciple or standard determines what makes voluntary exchange fair or unfair,
exploitative or nonexploitative’ (Arneson 2016a, p. 28). Perhaps, on
Arneson’s view, exploitation terms serve to categorise fairness terms. It is
unclear how they do even that. But suppose that Arneson is right about
the concept of exploitation, whose contours are defined by the fairness
view. I claim that there is a concept distinct from Arneson’s, call it shmex-
ploitation, whose contours are defined by the domination view, which takes
cases like Pit and Ant and Grasshopper as instances of wrongful advantage-
taking. If I am right about these instances, then shmexploitation captures
instances of wrongful advantage-taking that are surplus to exploitation:
shmexploitation is explanatorily superior to exploitation in that respect. We
should think of cases like Pit, Ant and Grasshopper, and Comeupance in
terms of shmexploitation, not exploitation.
There is, I conclude, a fundamental disagreement between advocates of
the fairness view and advocates of the domination view as to the bigger
picture: the latter takes exploitation claims to be about relations of domin-
ion and servitude. The former takes them to be about unfairness and mal-
distribution. On the one hand, the fairness view gives the wrong verdict on
cases like Ant and Grasshopper and Pit. If the lenience objection is sound,
then the fairness view generates false negatives. On the other hand, the
fairness view is unable to account for the distinctive wrongmaking features
of naked instances of unfair treatment—such as Free riders—as opposed to
cases involving abuse of power—such as the amended version of Free
riders. If the trivialisation objection is sound, then the canonical liberal view
deprives exploitation claims of any distinctive moral bite. It should be
rejected for these reasons.
7. Conclusion
This paper has argued that exploitation is a form of domination, namely
domination for self-enrichment. According to the domination account, such
self-enrichment involves the power-induced extraction of unilateral service
from others. I have argued that this account of exploitation is distinct from
competing theories of exploitation; that it gives rise to a plausible account
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of structural domination; that it captures intuitions about predatory behav-
iour and about the special explanatory function of exploitation complaints
surplus to these theories, and that it is superior to these theories for
these reasons.
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Appendix: Rich and Poor
In Section 1.3, I broached Roemer’s Rich and Poor example. The example is important,
because it implies that labour flow is indispensable to any account of exploitation. Yet
the example seems to involve domination-induced unequal exchange, on the part of
Poor. Are we to infer that Poor exploits Rich, in Roemer’s example? I think we should.
Here’s why.
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In Roemer’s setup, Rich and Poor’s respective endowments of 3 and 1 are not
proportional to the power each of them has over the other. Indeed, in Rich and
Poor, Poor has more power over Rich rather than vice versa. And if Poor can use
that power to get Rich to provide unilateral service to Poor, then Poor exploits
Rich. This is a palatable conclusion because Roemer’s world is not our world. In
our world, wealth is normally proportional to power over others. This has to do
with the specific form that wealth assumes here.
Our world is well-described, as a first pass, by this sentence: ‘The wealth of
those societies, in which the capitalist mode of production reigns, presents itself as
an “immense heap of commodities.”’ (Marx 1976, p. 125). If this is true, if wealth is
power-conferring, and if enough social relations are commodified, then social
wealth will confer power on those who possess enough commodities. That power,
which is called capital, consists in the ability of the wealthy to command the
labour of others. So either Rich and Poor does not represent a capitalist society—in
which case Roemer’s endowments are not capital—or Rich is not really rich and
Poor is not really poor, in the relevant sense.
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